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India increasingly vulnerable. He therefore argues for a nuclear force that relies
upon mobility to ensure its survivability.
The final section of Menon’s book is a
thorough discussion of the nuclear options open to India. He recommends that
India adopt a rail-garrison, land-based
missile force until it can shift to reliance
upon ballistic missile–carrying submarines by 2020 (a date that seems extremely optimistic, given the troubled
history of India’s indigenous submarine
programs). He also argues that India
should field cruise missiles for both conventional and nuclear missions.
Menon is skeptical of the contention that
nuclear weapons themselves offer an effective deterrent. He argues that a state’s
force posture and command and control
arrangements are also important. Menon
calls for extensive changes in Indian military decision making, suggesting arrangements that draw heavily upon those of
the United States. He believes, for example, that India needs to adopt its own
version of the national command authority and Joint Chiefs of Staff to command
and control its nuclear forces. He also argues that India needs to codify its targeting policy in its own version of the Single
Integrated Operational Plan.
A Nuclear Strategy for India is likely only
the first of many efforts to think through
the implications of India’s decision to go
nuclear. While but a first step, it provides
the groundwork upon which others will
doubtless build.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN

Naval War College
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For some reason, Korea is a major blind
spot in U.S. thinking about world affairs.
Public commemoration of the Korean
War’s fiftieth anniversary is almost nonexistent compared to the attention paid
to the Second World War in the first half
of the 1990s. Today, the Cold War lingers
on in East Asia with the continuing division of the peninsula, which remains one
of the locations in which the United
States is most likely to go to war in the
immediate future. Yet the American interaction with Korea is in many ways a
success story in U.S. foreign policy, at
least in the southern half of the country.
The Republic of Korea has become an industrial, market-driven economy with a
civilian-led democratic government that
enjoys grassroots support among its citizenry. The road to this state, however,
was fraught with extreme danger. From
the mid-1960s until the early 1980s, there
was a nearly continuous real possibility
of war on the peninsula again. One of the
periods of maximum danger was between
1979 and 1981, in the wake of the assassination of President Park Chung-hee and
a military coup that toppled the civilian
successor government.
General John A. Wickham was the commander of U.S. forces in Korea during
this period, and this book is a memoir of
his efforts to keep the United States and
South Korea focused on their combat
missions despite the turmoil of the time.
Even though Wickham was a military
commander, he could not turn a blind
eye to politics. The South Korean army
had become thoroughly politicized after
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Park’s eighteen-year reign. The late president had been a general who had come to
power by a military coup. Many of his
protégés worried about their futures after
their mentor’s death. There was also a
good deal of concern and confusion about
the North Korean role and its likely reaction to the assassination. Initially the
South Korean military supported the
constitutional process, but a number of
junior generals with conservative social
views and a strong distrust of civilian
politicians decided to take control of the
government two months after Park’s
death on 12 December (thus “12/12”).
Wickham recommended a hands-off approach toward the coup. If it turned violent, or if there were a countercoup, there
would be a good possibility that the
North would intervene. The general
knew this advice would not be popular
back in Washington with President
Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy
team. “The U.S. government obviously
was out of sorts over the ‘12/12 Incident.’
It was a setback to the democratization
process in the ROK [Republic of Korea]
and a poor harbinger for the human
rights goals that were central to President
Carter’s foreign policy.”

He was drawn into a number of political
matters against his wishes; one of them
almost destroyed his career. One of
Wickham’s themes is the influence the
United States had in South Korea. The
United States had reduced its ground
force numbers in Korea during the administration of Richard Nixon, and the
efforts of Carter to withdraw the troops
entirely made many Koreans question
the U.S. commitment. “The American
mission was over a barrel, because our
basic objective was to protect the ROK
from invasion. That left us obliged to accept the realities of the Korean political
apparatus, with all of its warts, and to
work with it as best we could.”

Wickham’s efforts were constantly focused
on trying to keep the South Korean army
“facing north”—that is, preparing to deal
with the military threat of North Korea.
This ever-present danger made the political maneuverings of coup and countercoup leaders all the more dangerous. The
possibility that the North might attack in
an effort to take advantage of the political
weakness of the South was one that intelligence indicated was real. Indeed, the
story Wickham tells evokes images of Saigon in the mid-1960s.

Overall, the United States was fortunate
to have as talented an individual as Wickham in place during this difficult time.
Officers assigned to Korea or to any position abroad where they must deal with
matters that involve factors that transcend those of an operational or tactical
nature can profit from this book.
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This memoir is rich with information.
Although Wickham at times overstates
the limits of U.S. influence, his basic
point is correct: Koreans, not Americans,
were going to decide the fate of Korea. It is
also clear that cultural misperception
complicated relations. General Chun
Doo-hwan, the leader of the coup, failed
to recognize that civil-military relations
in the United States were different from
those in Korea and therefore incorrectly
assumed that Wickham played a role in
formulation of policy.

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

Texas A&M University–Commerce

In Wickham’s view, many of the generals
he dealt with were politicians in uniform.
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